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On Establishing a Housing Right of Contract for 
Homeless Youth in America 
Michael Glassman1 & Donna Karno2 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than a century, the social policy emphasis has been on family 
reunification or some socially acceptable facsimile (e.g., foster care). The 
difficulty is that for many youth, this type of reunification is not an option 
that can be trusted due to dysfunctional families and failures of social 
service agencies. These youths are left with no viable alternatives partly 
because they are denied a right to sign a long-term contract for housing. 
Thus, the youths are left to live as transients in oftentimes dangerous 
environments. A lack of available long-term housing becomes a major 
impediment to the ability of many homeless youth to reintegrate into 
mainstream society and reestablish a positive life trajectory.  
Homelessness has a very different meaning for youth, especially those 
under eighteen,3 than it does for adults. It is more difficult for homeless 
youth under eighteen to obtain shelter on their own because even if they 
have the means, or are sponsored by somebody who has the means, to 
obtain a permanent residence, many private shelter providers (e.g., 
landlords) will not allow them to enter into long-term contracts. Society’s 
denial of youth’s right to contract is based primarily on ideological belief 
systems that revolve around a growing fear of children and youth and the 
loss of a mythological childhood innocence. However, the age of eighteen is 
an arbitrary marker and does not reflect the continuum of an individual’s 
cognitive, social, and emotional development. In other words, based solely 
on age and absent all other reasons, an individual can be and often is 
deprived of full membership in the larger U.S. social community. The 
societal and individual repercussions of this deprivation are vast and 
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sometimes devastating. We assert that while arguments can be made against 
a universal right to shelter, denying a right to contract for housing based 
solely on an age barrier cannot be justified from either an economic or a 
moral perspective. 
In U.S. society, the right to contract is very important because housing 
itself is treated less as a right and more as property that can be exchanged 
for goods. It is part of the free market, neoclassical ideology4 that has been 
dominant in the United States for at least the last four decades since the 
publication of Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom5 in 1962.6 The 
idea of housing being a commodity rather than a right means that the mode 
and ability of exchange, or more specifically the perception of an 
individual’s mode and ability of exchange, is determinative of shelter. 
Individuals under eighteen years of age are often perceived as having far 
less capability to engage in fair exchange over the long term. They are 
marginalized within the housing market with little chance of finding 
permanent, safe shelter outside of government-sponsored programs that can 
be destructive and dangerous (so much so that a large population of youth 
would rather face the dangers of the streets than enter, or reenter, these 
government-sponsored programs). 
In this paper, we will address four interrelated issues: (1) the concept of a 
natural right to housing, which is further explored through economic and 
moral arguments; (2) the right to contract as a socio-moral issue, as well as 
an economic and legal issue; (3) society’s responsibility to define the right 
to contract; and (4) the ideology behind denying minors a right to contract. 
Finally, we discuss possibilities for changing to a more generative model of 
viewing homeless youths and defining their right to contract for housing.  
In regards to the concept of a natural right to housing, we explore the 
economic efficiency of housing as individually determined property that 
individuals must be capable of obtaining in a competitive market,7 as 
opposed to housing as a basic obligation of a society or community to its 
citizens that creates a universal capability for living a good and productive 
On Establishing a Housing Right of Contract for Homeless Youth in America 439 
VOLUME 7  •  ISSUE 2  •  2009 
life.8 We approach the right to contract as a socio-moral issue,9 where 
individuals should be judged on developmental issues such as social 
perspective taking and recognition of motivations.10 Many times these 
developmental milestones are only minimally correlated with specific 
ages.11  
We make the argument that to deny youth who have attained higher 
levels of developmental social rights, such as the right to contract, leads to 
alienation of these youth and loss of the youth as potentially productive 
members of society. We then explore the following question: if society 
determines that housing is a commodity, does society have a responsibility 
to define the right to contract, and how and why should it develop those 
definitions? This is an especially critical issue for minors because they are 
the population so often marginalized in right to contract laws. Finally, we 
argue that the denial of the right to housing to individuals who are 
developmentally capable but have not reached the age of majority is more 
ideological than rational and is based on a fear of “out-of-control” youth. 
The social compact would be strengthened by taking a more generative 
approach to the housing needs of homeless youth under eighteen years of 
age—a program that recognizes the needs of the whole human being and all 
developmentally capable human beings as having full membership in our 
society. 
In this particular article, we are distinguishing emancipation from right to 
contract. Emancipation is an issue where society plays a mediating role in 
the parent-child relationship (with society almost always bestowing power 
on the parents before the child has reached the age of majority). On the 
other hand, the right of a youth to sign a housing contract is related to the 
direct relationship between society and that youth.  
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I. THE RIGHT TO HOUSING: FROM ARROW TO SEN TO RAWLS AND                       
KOHLBERG  
We propose four ways to look at the right to housing—the first two, 
economic, and the second two, moral. We first explore an economic 
argument based on Kenneth Arrow’s efficiency model. Second, we discuss 
Amartya Sen’s counter-economic argument based on his decision-making 
perspective. In response to the economic arguments, we then shift to the 
moral arguments. Third, we look at John Rawls’s moral argument based on 
the difference principle. Finally, through Lawrence Kohlberg’s natural right 
principle, we further develop Rawls’s moral argument and directly argue 
against Arrow’s perspective of housing as a commodity.  
A. Arrow and Housing as a Commodity 
A competitive atmosphere, where the ability to obtain housing is based 
on individual accomplishment, leads to conditions of better housing for 
society as a whole. As an efficient mode of housing development, market 
competition will lead to better and more available housing and will push 
individuals to become more productive in society in order to obtain 
premium housing.  
Kenneth Arrow’s “Impossibility Theorem,” a core tenet of neoclassical 
economic theory, which informs this position, suggests that it is impossible 
for all members of the social group to be satisfied at all times, even if they 
separately vote on every issue in a democratic order.12 Added to the 
representative democracy ideal of representation by elected individuals with 
better information and superior decision making capabilities13 is the idea 
that these representatives must be more concerned with the aggregate health 
of the community than with the distributed consequences. Representatives 
must do what is best for the society as a whole and accept that not 
everybody will be satisfied. This combination of representative government 
and neoclassical economics represents what might be considered the 
brighter side of the Malthusian coin14—it is impossible to satisfy everyone 
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and still have a successful social system, so it is better to accept the travails 
of the weaker, rather than put society as a whole at risk by trying to reach 
some impossible ideal.15 By applying this theory to housing, some may be 
left without adequate shelter, but in the aggregate, the society as a whole is 
better and more efficiently housed. 
Under Arrow’s theory, it becomes less important that individuals within 
the society feel they have the capabilities for different types of functioning 
and more important that higher level capabilities exist somewhere in the 
society. For instance, in American society it is important that people have 
the ability to keep as much wealth as they can attain and that they have the 
capability to pass this wealth between generations. This becomes the social 
choice within the realization that some will have to suffer to maintain this 
higher-level capability. The idea that material wealth must be based 
completely on competition is reinforced by the aggregate view of social 
functioning—when more people get to keep more of their wealth, it 
increases measurements such as the Gross National Product (GNP), so it 
must be the best possible course for the society.16  
In this scenario, homelessness becomes a potential necessary evil to 
maintain active competition for housing. This is a result of a Malthusian 
ethos17 closely aligned with the neoclassical model—if society provides 
housing for individuals who are unable to obtain housing through their own 
actions, it allows the weaker parts of the population to not only survive but 
propagate, thus endangering the health of the society or community by 
bringing down its aggregate net worth. This framework extends to homeless 
youths who are the responsibility of their parents. The idea that society 
benefits from youths competing to get into the best schools based on their 
parents’ resources can be extended down to the idea that youths should also 
have to compete for housing based on their parents’ resources.  
Arrow theorem would reject a right to housing based on fairness. If 
societies overreach on being fair to those members who are disadvantaged, 
then societies are necessarily going to be unfair to those who are 
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advantaged. When housing is provided as a right, it is unfair to advantaged 
individuals who already have housing because it brings down the value of 
what they have worked and struggled to acquire. Housing is transformed 
into a redistributed good at the expense of both personal liberty and overall 
community worth. The neoclassical model suggests that if a choice is to be 
made it should be in favor of the aggregate wealth of the society as a 
whole—supporting property rights and the value of property.  
However, in the next section of the article, we argue that guaranteeing 
housing to youths is actually good for society as a whole. By guaranteeing 
housing to youths, it actually affects the parents’ long-term desire and 
ability to positively impact the aggregate economic wellbeing of the society 
because choices are made for the good of the children. 
B. Sen and Capability Through Housing 
There are three arguments—one economic and two moral—that can be 
made against Arrow and the neoclassical position that housing should be 
considered a commodity that individuals compete for.18 The competing 
economic argument, advanced by Amartya Sen, an economist who focuses 
on wellbeing as the primary measurement of societal functioning, is more of 
a process position that claims that when society provides for individuals’ 
basic functions, it enables (but does not guarantee) that individuals have the 
capability of meeting their potential.19 The individual, him or herself, works 
to meet this potential. In other words, there is no sense of top-down 
engineering in basic functions such as housing; there is also no absolute 
right, but simply the assertion that the more people in society who are 
capable of reaching their full potential, the more successful the society. 
Within this framework, the success of the society is not measured in terms 
of some aggregate number such as GNP, but on individual comparisons. It 
is recognition of these individual comparisons that make a society safer and 
more secure, more capable of overcoming tragedy, and more likely to 
progress in terms of wealth and stability.20  
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One of Sen’s major points, from an economic perspective, is that it is 
illusory to judge the health of society by an aggregate such as GNP, which 
itself is a statistic created by those who benefit most from such measures.21 
The primary way to measure the health of a society is by looking at what 
the society provides for all of its citizens.22 The provisions are not 
considered entitlements (that every member of society is entitled to a certain 
level of basic needs), but investments (that every member of society should 
be provided with the basic functions that will make them capable actors 
within society).23 This includes water, food, shelter, and information. Once 
individuals have these basic functions, their role and place in society is 
determined through their own action. Sen believes in the efficacy of human 
action within the context of these basic functions.24  
More importantly, he believes that most poor decisions and most great 
human tragedies are, at least in part, the result of a lack of these basic 
functions.25 Communities are destroyed from within by citizens incapable of 
making the best decisions, rather than by natural Malthusian disasters (e.g., 
flood, famine, disease, war)26—which, according to Arrow, must be 
survived by some segments of society at the expense of others. Sen’s main 
example is the causes of famines. He makes the argument that famines are 
never the result of a lack of food, but a lack of the basic function of 
information.27 Sen persuasively argues that there is always enough food in 
famines; however, the difficulty and disaster is that individuals do not know 
or understand how to access this available food.28 The same can be said for 
housing. There is enough housing in the United States—the problem is that 
those who are homeless do not have the information or wherewithal to 
access it. The difficulty with housing, as with food, is that shelter is also a 
basic function. An individual’s ability to get a job and an education is 
limited by his or her lack of housing.  
An individual’s ability to lead a life that has a positive trajectory within 
the boundaries of society is critical to a well-functioning, adaptable society. 
When the quality of life for individuals in society is higher, and there is less 
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differentiation between members of society, the quality of life for the 
society as a whole is better and the society is more successful and resilient. 
Sen argues that capability is a more reliable measure of a society’s 
economic wellbeing than aggregate measures such as GNP.29  
If society allows all individuals access to basic functions such as housing, 
society as a whole will be more capable and resilient than if the society 
leaves youths to compete for housing. While Sen provides the economic 
argument for providing homeless youths the right to housing, Sen’s 
argument can be bolstered with moral arguments that advance housing as a 
right. 
C. Rawls and the Natural Right to Housing 
To pursue housing as a right is to approach the issue from a very different 
perspective—moral rather than economic. This idea of natural rights is most 
attributed to the work of John Rawls, discussed in this part, and can 
possibly be more easily explained through the moral theory of Lawrence 
Kohlberg, discussed in the following section.30  
Rawls approaches the idea of rights from a political and moral 
perspective rather than from an economic perspective.31 His ideas of liberal 
justice suggest that societies work best when their decisions are determined 
through justice based on a universal concept of fairness.32 While earlier 
liberal philosophers, such as Locke and Mill, suggest that human rights are 
metaphysical and absolute,33 Rawls separates himself by suggesting that 
rights actually emanate from a natural desire to live in a fair society where 
individuals treat each other with respect: give individuals in a group the 
chance to be fair and they will be fair.34   
Rawls’s view addresses one of the major arguments made against a right 
to housing—that it is an arbitrary right determined through some 
metaphysical belief system.35 The degree to which Rawls’s ideas on justice 
would lead to a right to housing is open for debate, but it is a fair starting 
point. Though Rawls’s progression of fairness based in justice does 
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presume some absolute principles such as the right of free expression, and 
the right of free association (necessary for the development of 
political/moral schemes based on fairness), it does not necessarily lead to 
either property rights or the right to contract (presumably these would be 
decided through community consensus).36 Some societies may prefer to 
promote property rights (which presumably would work against a right to 
housing), and some may not. 
While there is no definitive right to housing discussed by Rawls, a 
neoclassical approach would dismiss such a right. The aforementioned 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem37 would approach the issue thus: if societies 
overreach on being fair to those members who are disadvantaged, they are 
necessarily going to be unfair to those who are advantaged. When housing 
is provided as a right, it is unfair to advantaged individuals who already 
have housing because it brings down the value of what they have worked 
and struggled for. Housing is transformed into a redistributed good at the 
expense of both personal liberty and overall community worth. The 
neoclassical model suggests that if a choice is to be made it should be in 
favor of the aggregate wealth of the society as a whole—supporting 
property rights and the value of property.  
When contrasted to the neoclassical model, one possible road to a right to 
housing through Rawls’s theory is his conception of the difference 
principle.38 Rawls’s difference principle argues that the only time it is 
appropriate to be unfair is when unfairness works in favor of the 
disadvantaged groups in society.39 For Rawls, in societies where there are 
homeless individuals, the right to housing should supersede the right to 
property. This would be especially true in societies with homeless youth 
because homeless youth can be considered the most disadvantaged group 
and often lack other protective justice principles. In a just society, the right 
to housing for all youth should be an inevitable and absolute consequence 
of open and free rational choice of individuals who are creating a fair 
society. It is likely that Rawls would consider societies who do not provide 
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housing for youth as outlaw states or states burdened by unfavorable 
conditions.40 The difficulty in this progression of ideas is that Rawls never 
really explains the rational necessity behind his difference principle. Why 
would making sure that homeless youth have open access to housing—just 
because they are severely disadvantaged—make society fairer, beyond a 
metaphysical belief that it is so? Kohlberg provides a better explanation 
through his moral theory. 
D. Kohlberg, Morality, and the Right to Housing 
The issue brought to the forefront by Rawls is that a right to housing is a 
moral issue. But Rawls concentrates on morality at the level of social 
contract;41 to make the argument for a right to housing, levels beyond just 
the social contract need to be considered. The right to housing is best 
argued at a higher level of moral consciousness than social contract—as a 
universal right that needs to be brought down into the practical real world.   
Kohlberg’s moral scheme is based on progressive levels of perspective 
taking.42 There are three general stages (with two levels within each 
stage).43 The first stage is preconventional morality—where individuals are 
incapable of (or refuse to) take the perspective of the other in their 
determination of rights (e.g., “might makes right”).44 While this moral stage 
may often be used in action, it is rarely used in justification. The second 
stage is conventional morality, where individuals take the perspective of the 
other, but only those who can have a direct or indirect impact on their 
lives.45 This level demands recognition of the needs of others in relation to 
one’s self. People realize that in order for society to continue, and for 
actions to have meaning beyond the immediate, there must be some type of 
shared or agreed-upon moral structure that guides decision-making 
processes. Social contract lives at this second level, along with the 
agreements and assumptions behind Arrow’s impossibility theory.46 But 
there are no overarching rights at this conventional level, since everything is 
up for discussion and debate within the community; thus, housing the 
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homeless may be a rational decision, but it is not a predetermined 
obligation. 
It is at the third, postconventional level of moral thinking where a right to 
housing has salience. In the postconventional stage, human rights—the right 
of every individual to have basic levels of respect, care, and freedom—
supersede all other considerations, including social contract.47 As opposed 
to Rawls’s theory that the basic rights of liberty and self expression do not 
exist so that we might come together as a community and determine societal 
principles, Kohlberg argues that they exist solely on the basis of each 
person’s humanity and our obligations as humans to fellow members of our 
species.48 This means that no society can ever take away these rights, or 
develop a rationalization on why they should not take priority in our social 
activity (e.g., we cannot provide housing because it will impact aggregate 
economic factors such as GNP). Kohlberg was well aware that few reach 
the postconventional level of moral thinking, and even fewer act from it.49 
Still, it provides a strong, logical argument for a right to housing that few 
can counter. 
The difficulty is that the abstract argument for human rights based on 
human obligation is an “ought” argument—it is persuasive only in terms of 
what a society ought to do, not in terms of the way society is. A neoclassical 
argument promotes the idea that humans do not naturally take care of other 
humans—rather they compete with them—and that there is a “selfish 
gene.”50 Any person who promotes a right to housing is likely to be told that 
it is a noble idea, but it is divorced from reality. This is not the way that 
things are within our society, within any human society. Economic realism 
must trump social idealism. But economic realism only has power when 
analyzing society from a distance, at a specific point in time—a picture of 
society without relationships. History has suggested it is dangerous to 
ignore everyday, individual social casualties. For a generative model 
approach to exist and succeed, instead of neoclassical argument, Kohlberg’s 
moral thinking combined with Sen’s informative decision must be used to 
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reshape the arguments for the basic right to housing. As a result, in the next 
section, we take the abstract argument for human rights and apply it at the 
practical level—to homeless youth.  
II. THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT OF HOMELESS YOUTH 
There is a tension between economics and morality concerning the right 
to contract—and it is not as easily separated, especially when considering 
the rights and needs of youth who have no familial means of support. What 
further complicates this right is that a contract is simultaneously an issue of 
legal, economic, and moral implications. 
The legal aspect of a contract is obvious in that it is a binding agreement 
in which all parties who enter into it agree to honor their commitments. 
There are laws that make a contract binding so one party does not have the 
advantage over the other. The contract is a fail-safe for social agreement—
from an economic perspective, it is an addendum to social capital.51 Social 
capital basically represents the level of trust between members of a given 
community, or society, in their day-to-day interactions.52 Social capital and 
the rule of law have reciprocal interactions. The higher the level of social 
capital, the more individuals are willing to defer to the rule of law as a 
guarantor of their survival, safety, and social progress. The more that 
individuals defer to the rule of law by choice and without hesitation—
especially as it defines legal equality—the easier it becomes for members of 
a community to trust each other in their interactions and gain greater social 
capital.  
Used as an economic tool, the lower the level of social capital, the more 
safeguards the community or society needs to put in place to protect the 
individuals.53 The most efficient transaction, which occurs in close-knit 
communities, can involve a minor signal between those involved in the 
transaction, such as a handshake or a nod of the head. Coleman describes 
these types of high-level social capital transactions in tight-knit 
communities; an example is the orthodox/Hassidic Jewish community that 
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dominates the diamond district in New York where expensive diamonds are 
borrowed and traded with few, if any, formal safeguards outside the web of 
community relationships.54 On the other hand, even the most simple 
contracts between those who do not share any communal trust require not 
only multiple levels of safeguards, but also require outside interlocutors 
preparing and enforcing those contracts, as well as formalized sanctions 
against reneging on the contracts.55 As Fukiyama suggests, imposition of 
these safeguards adds unnecessary cost to any transaction.56  
Based on morality, a community sets its standards for transactions—in 
this case, contracts—based on the levels of trust and reciprocity, and each 
person in that society understands that level of trust and the obligations that 
it entails. This generalized agreement—what Locke referred to as the social 
contract—is first defined by the community, but in its implementation, the 
agreement comes to define community in important ways.57 This idea goes 
back to Plato’s Crito, which suggests that all individuals who wish to stay 
as part of a society implicitly agree to the social contract—but the opposite 
is also true, all those who are denied the social contract are implicitly, and 
sometimes explicitly, shunned as outsiders to the community.58 For 
example, a person who was not a member of the Hassidic community would 
not be trusted with the thousands of dollars in diamonds based on a few 
gestures and words; the denial of that transaction would immediately signal 
to the individual that he or she is not a member of the community that has 
agreed to this social contract. Similarly, homeless youth who are considered 
outsiders to normal society are denied basic transactions through social 
gestures and actions. 
The three interwoven issues of legal, economic, and moral aspects of the 
right to contract demonstrate that access to socially agreed-upon contract 
laws are so important. Denial of a right to contract goes beyond simply 
denying the chance to attain goods offered in that contract—it is a signal 
that the person being denied is excluded from that community or society, 
has no codified place within it, and is expected to leave. The denial of a 
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right to contract then is both an economic decision and an ethical decision, 
and the reasons for it must be considered at both levels.  
A. Economics, Youth, and Safeguards in the Right to Contract 
The economic decision must balance the cost of the contract against the 
worth of the goods received as a result of entering into the contract. The 
worth is dependent on the value systems of that community or society. If 
that community or society is acting within a neoclassical value system, then 
everything is measured in terms of material gain and loss.59 When a 
possible loss is two thousand dollars, but establishing a safeguard (e.g., 
hiring a lawyer) would cost three thousand dollars, then the application of a 
safeguard is lowered. However, if the community or society is acting within 
a human capability value system then the worth in providing capabilities is 
factored into the transaction, usually by the society as a whole rather than 
by individuals.60 For instance, a community or society might impose laws 
that all dwellings meet minimal standards. The society would regularly 
inspect buildings and houses to make sure they meet these standards. If the 
standards are not met, the society would impose heavy fines. Through these 
economic decisions, societal safeguards and expectations can be set in place 
to ensure that more homeless youth are able to access housing. However, 
economic solutions would not address ethical concerns.  
B. Ethics, Youth, and Alienation in the Right to Contract 
Perhaps more important than the economic issues in the right to contract 
are the ethical implications: if society denies an individual a contract, it is 
implicitly stating that it does not consider him or her to be a viable and 
trusted member of the society. The society is also denying the individual the 
same access to material and cultural capital that members of the society use 
to advance themselves,61 so society is not only saying that these individuals 
are not members of the community, but that they are being denied the 
opportunities to become members. This type of exclusion can lead to both 
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animosity and alienation on the part of the ousted group.62 Therefore, the 
reason for the exclusion must be well considered in both economic and 
moral terms. 
Returning to the example of the Hassidic community in the diamond 
district, the social contract is based, at least in part, on being an everyday 
member of that community. This includes dressing in a certain manner, 
behaving in a certain manner, and living and working in close proximity. 
Individuals that work in the diamond district actually take specific buses 
into the city. If an individual is excluded, it is not based (or cannot be 
claimed to be based) on preconventional decision-making processes. That 
is, the Hassidic diamond dealers are not denying those they deem as 
“others” because they feel more powerful (level one of preconventional)63 
or because they feel they can get away with it (level two of 
preconventional).64 They are not even denying rights because they feel these 
“others” would not offer them the same type of trust (level three of 
conventional).65 The Hassidic diamond sellers are not offering the rights 
because the “others” are not members, and do not want to be members, of 
the community that has agreed upon the social contract. Any time an 
individual is denied a contract, the person who is denying that right must 
have a similar comprehensive argument based on social contract for that 
denial to have ethical standing and for it not to be in some way detrimental 
to the community as a whole. 
The question, then, is as follows: is it ethical, and in the best interests of 
the community, to deny a right to contract to an individual who is under 
eighteen years of age just because they are under eighteen years of age? 
What if denial of this common right denies the individual a basic need that 
diminishes their capabilities and opportunities to participate as a full 
member of that society? If it is unethical, should there be safeguards against 
it and how extensive should those safeguards be? The economic argument, 
even from a neoclassical perspective, does not really make a great deal of 
sense. Individuals under eighteen have the same access to jobs as a large 
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portion of those who are over eighteen. If the issue of available income 
were an issue, then the denial of a housing contract should be based solely 
on income rather than on age. One could even make the argument that the 
younger group is more likely to have a steady income, because they are 
more likely to have fewer familial obligations. In any case, blanket denial of 
a right to contract seems like far too expensive a safeguard for what it might 
accomplish from an economic perspective: it narrows the pool of potential 
renters without any comparable true benefit. 
IV.  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DENYING THE RIGHT TO 
CONTRACT 
To exclude a youth under eighteen is a purely moral/ethical decision. 
There are actually two arguments that are made when minors are excluded 
from the right to contract in housing. The first argument is that this 
exclusion is in the best interests of the society, either because the minors are 
not full members of the community, or because they cannot function as full 
members of the community. The second argument is that this exclusion is in 
the best interests of the minor—that the minor is not capable of making 
responsible decisions so the society must make responsible decisions in the 
minor’s place. 
When society denies a minor a right, the implication is that the minor is 
not a full member of the society. The question, just as we explore in terms 
of the exclusionary practices of the Hasidim working in the diamond 
district, is what type of moral argument can be made to support this 
position, and can the argument reach the level of social contract? The 
preconventional arguments are relatively simple to make based on 
Kohlberg’s level one—that youth are denied the right to contract because 
they are simply less powerful than adults66—or perhaps more likely based 
on Kohlberg’s level two, that there are no repercussions for denying youths 
rights because they cannot vote and have no voice in lawmaking.67 
However, once society reaches the third level, in the (second) conventional 
On Establishing a Housing Right of Contract for Homeless Youth in America 453 
VOLUME 7  •  ISSUE 2  •  2009 
stage of moral judgment, the arguments for the denial of a right to contract 
based solely on being under eighteen becomes more difficult. The decision 
making could take one of two main forms. The first and stronger form 
would state that those over eighteen would not have wanted a right to 
contract when they were under eighteen, so they should not offer this right. 
The second and weaker form is that those over eighteen, knowing what they 
know now, would not have wanted a right to contract when they were under 
eighteen. A possible third argument is that if the rulemakers were landlords, 
they would not want minors to have a right to contract. However, once the 
question of why is raised, this argument is folded into the following 
discussion of youth and social contract. 
Kohlberg’s level four conventional argument may be the only one that 
actually suggests exclusionary practices can be part of a social system with 
ethical standards.68 The primary issue would be that minors can be excluded 
from the community or society because they are not yet recognized as full 
members. But the only way these individuals can not be considered full 
members when they live in the community and follow the behavioral 
standards of the community is if they do not understand the concept of 
social contract as the community has agreed to it.69 Research regarding 
moral decision-making processes contradicts this point. While abilities of 
moral decision making is connected to the development of more complex 
perspective taking, there is nothing to suggest that eighteen is a critical 
marker in this development.  
Youth could conceivably reach recognition of the social contract when 
they reach what Piaget called the formal operation period of cognitive 
development in early adolescence or what Selman referred to as reciprocal 
perspective taking.70 The suggestion that youth under fifteen are not capable 
of understanding the social contract is not supported by developmental 
research and literature. On the other hand, there are probably large numbers 
of adults over eighteen who do not understand the moral implications of the 
social contract.71 From a developmental perspective, if one has not 
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developed an understanding of the social contract by eighteen, there is a 
good possibility he will never develop this understanding, unless there is 
some change in the trajectory of his or her life (e.g., in the types of activities 
in which and people with whom he or she engages).72 This indicates how 
denying youth the adult right to contract is based on arbitrary standards of 
cognitive development. 
The alienation that the refusal of rights based on an assumption of 
development can engender in late adolescence and can be highly 
detrimental to social capital. One thing helping an adolescent achieve higher 
levels of moral competence is feeling a connection to the larger socio-moral 
atmosphere, and having positive perceptions of fairness as the norm of the 
larger community group.73 This may be one of the reasons why the moral 
competence of delinquents tends to lag behind nondelinquents.74 The denial 
of rights, such as a right to contract, works against the youth’s ability to 
reintegrate into the normalized, mainstream community. This alienation 
would be especially salient for youth who were already functioning at a 
higher level or moral competence because they might be more aware of 
their overt, unfair exclusion from the community. Their alienation would be 
further heightened through their awareness of the inclusion of adults with 
lower functioning levels or moral competence. The youth would recognize 
the arbitrariness of those adults being included into the community, and 
provided the right to contract despite not having a complete comprehension 
of a social contract. 
The denial of housing contracts based on an individual’s juvenile status is 
detrimental to the social group from both an economic and a moral/ethical 
perspective. Unlike the denial of a right to housing, there is no counter-
argument to why there should not be a denial of the right to contract based 
on age.  
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IV. MINORS, RIGHT TO CONTRACT, AND IDEOLOGY OF FEAR 
Along with previous economic and moral arguments to allow homeless 
youth the right to contract, we suggest that the denial of the right to contract 
for minors is based in an ideology of fear. This terror is founded in an 
ideological position that is based within an authoritarian world view, in 
which fear of youth is predominant.  
A. The Policy of Ideology 
We use the word ideological without any of the negative connotation it 
has developed over time, instead referring to its original definition as being 
the study and use of ideas separate from human action and experience, 
which should be used to guide human actions towards a more ideal 
society.75 As Hegel suggested when discussing the ideologues of the French 
revolution, ideology allows humans to start walking on their heads: to start 
leading with their ideas.76 It offers a wider view of individual actions. 
Individuals make decisions based on the vision of an idealistic society.77 If 
what occurs in everyday life does not conform to the types of actions that 
will lead to the implementation of societal ideals, then it is incumbent on 
individuals to develop strategies to change everyday actions, rather than 
reconfigure the ideals.78 This is why ideology, rather than pragmatic or even 
obvious considerations, often drives policy decisions. 
In the right circumstances, ideology can be used as a tool to drive policy 
and policy-based decisions. But like any tool, ideology takes on its 
character through the motivations and goals of the individuals using it. 
Because ideals that (supposedly) guide action tend to be relatively static 
(getting actions to meet ideals tends to be a long term project); and because 
whatever changes do occur are created by those who have special 
knowledge, and therefore access, to those ideals (the elite), ideology is an 
especially resonant and purposeful tool for those who are interested in 
maintenance and protection of the status quo. Ideology tends to have its 
greatest impact when used by those with an authoritarian mind set. 
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Minors are denied a right to contract for housing because of an 
underlying authoritarian ideology that independent youth are dangerous to 
the community and that the granting of such rights might lead to chaos.79 
The denial of the independence and social recognition that would come with 
minors’ ability to sign a housing contract is an attempt to maintain the 
community status quo, in which any individual under eighteen is dependent 
on a parent or guardian. The parent or guardian is held responsible for any 
damage of or transgression toward the social code by the minor, and any 
minor who does not have a parent or guardian is marginalized (or deemed 
nonexistent).  
B. Authoritarianism and the Ideology of Childhood: Dangerous Youth 
Authoritarianism blocks effective public policy by inserting authoritarian 
goals into those of the population experiencing the problem, often by 
exploiting fear and anxiety.80 When individuals fear they might lose 
something from their lives, they start to look for things—individuals, 
symbols, ideas—that will protect them from that loss. Authoritarianism 
plays a powerful role in the underlying assumptions about a youth’s right to 
contract. The type of control authoritarianism offers allows for the 
maintenance of predetermined societal ideals. The ideal of childhood as a 
time of innocence, naiveté, and hope is a relatively new concept, but it has 
taken a powerful hold on our society.81 There are two ways that this ideal 
has been used as a tool to drive policy and policy-based decisions. First, 
society must do everything it can to make sure that the innocence and 
naiveté of children is maintained. Second, society must fear children who 
do not fit into this mold and who do not accept their roles as innocent, pliant 
children; they are alien and dangerous to the commonwealth—either 
because they threaten the true innocent children or because they threaten the 
order of society as a whole. The loss to society is the innocence of children 
who must be protected from those children who are no longer innocent. 
Those children or homeless youth who are no longer innocent require 
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authoritarian prescriptions, such as entry into the juvenile justice system, for 
the protection of society. Thus, a large number of homeless youth are taken 
to court and jailed.82 
In the early part of the twentieth century the idea of protecting childhood 
innocence was predominant.83 There was a belief in a right to childhood that 
was protected from the cruelties of society, and it was the community’s 
obligation to institute safeguards that kept children in a protected realm.84 
The child who was somehow separated from home and family was 
considered a victim.85 There was nothing inherently wrong or dangerous 
about the child. Led by progressive activists such as Jane Addams, the 
right-to-childhood movement established separate juvenile courts, humane 
orphanages, group homes, and special programs for minors.86 The myth of 
the child as innocent persisted; the goals were reunification with the family, 
or unification with some state sanctioned facsimile of a family, where that 
innocence could be reclaimed. Even in the Depression, when homelessness 
for all ages was not uncommon, the persistent existence of this myth was in 
evidence.87 As Minehan observed in his Depression-era ethological study of 
youth homelessness, “we are attempting to force youths to remain at home 
when there is in the true sense of the word no home in which they can 
remain.”88 
In the middle of the twentieth century, the view of youth began to change 
towards a more authoritarian, fear-based model. There was a growing fear 
of the disruption and chaos that youth were capable of causing, best 
depicted in movies of the time, such as The Wild One89 and Blackboard 
Jungle.90 The fear increased, along with the growing independence of youth 
through cars and the mainstreaming of nighttime hangouts. Youth moved 
from being under the protective umbrella of the family to being independent 
and mobile freeagents. Rather than victims of society, independent youth 
who did not return to their homes were seen as dangerous—engaging in 
antisocial and sometimes illegal behavior that could, in fact, infect the 
middle-class lifestyle.91 This actually became a common theme in movies 
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and books: how a bad child needed to be quarantined from good children 
lest they be led astray (e.g., Rebel Without a Cause).92 This growing fear 
and shift in perception of dangerous youth culminated in the Juvenile 
Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961.93 The emphasis, as 
stated in the title, was on ‘control’ of youth, and one of the best ways to 
enforce control was denial of rights.  
We argue that the denial of the right to contract for minors who are 
otherwise capable from an economic and a moral perspective is basically an 
authoritarian policy based in fear. This fear is promoted through the two-
part ideological tool of childhood: innocence and threat. Homeless youth, 
who live outside the reach and/or control of the family, are therefore 
dangerous and a threat to the well-being of society in general and to the 
good children who stay with their family. Therefore, these homeless youth 
must be denied any rights that would suggest that they are functioning, 
integrated, and accepted members of the common society.  
As discussed in Part III, denying a minor the right to contract symbolizes 
that this individual has not achieved membership in the society and is 
alien—a stranger and an outsider. The denial is not based on lack of social 
capital, cultural capital, or material capital,94 but is a complete repudiation 
of the youth based on fear. Society fears the youth, so it denies the youth 
even minimal membership within it.  
The fear of homeless youth is not unique to the right to contract issue; 
instead we argue that it permeates proactive policy geared towards these 
youth. The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act (RHYA) misses 
opportunities for helping these youth because it focuses primarily on family 
reunification through intervention, suggesting a deficit model for both the 
youth and their families.95 Youths who are not with their family, or under 
direct state supervision (e.g., foster care), are essentially invisible or not 
worthy of help. Efforts to deal with the homeless from an ecological (the 
environments where they feel comfortable), social (the peer groups that 
share their unique ethos and view of the world), economic (street 
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economies), or emotional perspective are very limited. Youth who do not fit 
the model of middle-class values are not really recognized as full members 
of the society.  
The ideology of fear of homeless youth does not serve the needs of either 
the individual youth or the society at large and works against the general 
rule of law by denying a possibly capable individual access to a basic need. 
This can make the homeless youth less equal in the society. The level of 
trust between homeless youth and society in general is diluted, influencing 
the homeless youth’s willingness to make linkages with positive social 
settings. This world view of fear of homeless youth, as are most 
authoritarian world views, is ultimately deleterious to the fabric of the 
society. It drives society apart, alienating marginal populations even 
further—but societies still must find a way to deal with these populations, 
which do not disappear simply because they are marginalized. Devising 
pragmatic methods that allow those under eighteen to have open and fair 
access to housing would have a positive generative effect on our social 
systems. 
V. CREATING A GENERATIVE MODEL ON THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT 
The right to contract for housing may be the most important part of 
putting youth back on a positive life trajectory, particularly in U.S. society. 
Property rights have been a critical part of social recognition and social 
acceptability in the United States since the Declaration of Independence. 
Throughout our history, property rights have been tied to the right to vote 
and the rule of law.96 The dominant neoclassical paradigm put great 
emphasis on the ownership and protection of property.97 Youth are not 
allowed entry into social contracts involving property due to an arbitrary 
age cut off that has little value in light of current research on human 
development and capabilities. This necessarily sets a youth on a 
degenerative trajectory, from an economic perspective, and perhaps even 
more important for the social community, from a moral perspective. 
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Individuals who are in a society but who do not feel recognized by or part 
of a society feel far less compunction to adhere to norms—leading to even 
greater alienation in a downward spiral. If youth are alienated from fully 
participating in society from the beginning, it is inevitable that they suffer in 
this downward spiral. 
Society must take a more generative approach in dealing with the issue of 
homeless youth and housing, one that is based on reintegration of 
marginalized populations, specifically homeless youth. A generative society 
seeks to foster human potential for future generations.98 Humans are not 
isolates, but rather social beings in which relatedness to the world is of 
primary importance. Once societies begin to separate groups as “in” or 
“out,” the out group becomes meaningless, or wrong in some manner,99 thus 
blocking the ability of the out group to find acceptance in society. This is 
especially important because, although youth tend to be one of the most 
vulnerable populations in our society, they are also one of the most 
malleable from a socio-moral perspective.100 By putting youth into an 
ecological context where they find social acceptance, they have a greater 
possibility of adopting the ethos and the norms of that society or 
community. In the first part of the twentieth century, developing social 
policy focused on the idea of reintegration into society—part of what was 
known as the “whole child” movement.101 The emphasis was placed on 
family reunification, or finding some facsimile-type family.102 The focus of 
policy was on the future of the society and viewed the developing youth as 
a functioning, positive member of that society.103 
Current economic and social circumstances can make family 
reunification difficult, if not impossible, for a number of youth.104 In many 
cases, family reunification does not work towards social reintegration, and 
in the case of highly dysfunctional families, can even work against it. As a 
society we must make a choice about how we deal with youth who have no 
reasonable living alternative. Do we ignore these youths? Do we see them 
as outsiders, as criminals? Or do we find a way to treat them as full 
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members of our social community? A generative approach suggests 
developing strategies for treating disenfranchised youths as full members of 
society—based on capabilities rather than age. Because one of the most 
basic needs is housing and because one of the most basic rights in our 
society is a right to contract for housing (based on the ability to pay), 
society should go out of its way to guarantee a right to contract. 
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